The Great Locomotive Chase Read online

  THE GREAT LOCOMOTIVE CHASE

  The Andrews Raid 1862

  GORDON L. ROTTMAN

  CONTENTS

  INTRODUCTION

  ORIGINS

  INITIAL STRATEGY

  THE PLAN

  THE RAID

  Cross-country into Dixie

  The train-stealers

  “Someone is running off with your train!”

  Kingston–Rome Junction

  The great chase

  The end of the line

  THE RAIDERS’ FATE

  ANALYSIS

  CONCLUSION

  FURTHER READING

  INTRODUCTION

  The American Civil War, often described as the first “modern war,” saw a great deal of mobile warfare over large regions, with much reliance placed on the nation’s well-developed railroad system. Trains were used to move troops and supplies to the front, shuttle reinforcements, and evacuate casualties. In April 1862 Union forces in southern Tennessee conducted an offensive into Alabama to the south, eventually seizing Huntsville, and then striking northeastward to take Chattanooga, Tennessee just over the state line from Georgia.

  Chattanooga was linked to Atlanta, Georgia to the south-southeast by a 138-mile-long, single-track railroad over which reinforcements and supplies could be sent to the Confederate stronghold. To hamper rail reinforcement efforts, the Union command developed an audacious and unprecedented plan. Led by a freelance civilian spy, Kentuckian James Andrews, a party of 22 volunteer soldiers from three Ohio infantry regiments, plus another civilian volunteer, would disable the rail line. Andrews was a colorful and somewhat shady character who had previously smuggled quinine into the south for military and civilian use, also developing a reputation as a spy, playing both sides of the line. Nonetheless, the Union decided to trust him with this unorthodox mission. Wearing civilian clothes, the raiders traveled in groups cross-country to Chattanooga and then bought train tickets on the Western & Atlantic Railroad to Marietta, Georgia, traveling on the same rail line they intended to disable. They were armed with the cover story that they were from Kentucky and intended to join a Kentuckian unit serving with the Confederate Army. In Marietta the next day they would board the northbound train to retrace their previous night’s route back to Chattanooga, only this time they would be running the train themselves. They intended to steal it, right from under the nose of a Confederate Army camp at Big Shanty.

  The Fletcher House (later to become the Kennesaw House and still identified as such) where the raiders spent the night of April 11. Beyond it is the Marietta Railroad Station where the raiders boarded their target train in the morning. Today the Kennesaw House is the Marietta Museum of History and next door is the Marietta Gone with the Wind Museum. The track to Big Shanty runs to the right. (Allen Shoppe)

  The north end of the 1,447ft long tunnel through Chetoogeta Mountain – Tunnel Hill. It was from this end of the tunnel that the General and Texas emerged on their high-speed run northward. The original tunnel is no longer in use and the rails have been removed, but the tunnel’s length may be walked by foot. The enlarged 1928 tunnel to the left is still in use. (Author)

  On April 12, 1862 the revolver-armed raiders stole the Chattanooga-bound train – the General – after the crew and other passengers had disembarked for breakfast. Dropping the passenger cars, the Union raiders headed north, pursued by the highly agitated and hugely determined conductor, William Fuller. Thus began what, 88 miles and six hours later, came to be known as the Great Locomotive Chase and was to go down in history as one of the most exciting events of the Civil War.

  The Andrews Raid is commonly called the Great Locomotive Chase, owing to the popular 1956 Walt Disney movie of the same name; it is also referred to as Andrews’ Wild Raid, the Railroad Raid of ’62, the Chattanooga Railroad Expedition, and the Mitchel Raid, as the raid was launched by Brigadier General Ormsby Mitchel. In the South the raiders were simply known as the Engine-Thieves or Train-Stealers.

  Even though the phrase was not then in use, the Andrews Raid shows how critical small details and events are to special operations missions, and that no matter how well-planned the action, it can still be drastically affected by unforeseen circumstances. It also demonstrates that planners and the leaders on the ground can make decisions based only on what they know, and that they cannot perceive or anticipate what the enemy will do or what other external factors and events will impinge on the best-laid plans.

  In the spring of 2008 the author drove and explored on foot the entire route of the Great Locomotive Chase. Remarkably, many of the sites, the bridges, stations, and other places are still there and marked. One can get a close-up appreciation of the terrain, vegetation, and weather, and how this affected one of the most unique military operations of the Civil War.

  ORIGINS

  In the spring of 1862 the War in the West was in full swing and Confederate forces had to man a disconnected defensive line stretching from Memphis, Tennessee in the southwest corner of the state alongside the Mississippi River, running eastward north of the Mississippi and Alabama state lines and curving northeast through Chattanooga, Tennessee just north of the Georgia state line, then following the North Carolina state line, and eastward through southern Virginia to Richmond, the Confederacy’s capital. Roughly paralleling the Confederate front lines was a railroad line, mostly operated by the Memphis & Charleston and Virginia & Tennessee railroads. These lines provided the rebel armies with arms, munitions, rations and supplies, as well as allowing the evacuation of casualties. They also permitted the rapid movement of large numbers of troops to reinforce against Union attacks or to concentrate for their own attacks and forays into the North. The railroads were not just another means of transportation; they radically altered strategic planning and capabilities. An entirely new strategic and logistical thought process evolved during the course of the Civil War, which some senior officers grasped quickly, and others did not. It was no accident that many of the war’s major battles were fought over rail centers and that the advance and withdrawal of forces ebbed and flowed along rail lines. This was especially so since the road systems were crude and highly vulnerable to rain, which thousands of marching feet, horses, wagons, and caissons churned into mud. The flooding of countless streams in rainy weather created further problems and increased the reliance on rail travel.

  On the eve of the Civil War the United States possessed more rail mileage than the rest of the world combined. More than 1,000 miles in length, the east–west rail line was served by “trunk lines” running into the South connecting major commercial centers and seaports, into which flowed essential goods and materials delivered by blockade runners. The Confederacy’s factories, armories, plants, and fields furnished, albeit sparsely, goods and food to keep the war going. There were few such lines though. In the mid-South there were only three lines heading south: one from Memphis to New Orleans, another from Corinth, Mississippi to Mobile, Alabama, and the third from Chattanooga (a main rail center) to one of the South’s most important rail centers, Atlanta, Georgia. From there lines ran south and east connecting to lines running through the Carolinas and into Virginia, a major theater of the war.

  The nation’s sprawling railroads gave the opposing armies a strategic capability for rapidly moving masses of troops and logistics. Both sides quickly appreciated and exploited their potential. Here Union troops are loaded on boxcar roofs, a cooler alternative than the stifling boxcars, which may have been full of supplies.

  The single line that wound its way through the north Georgia hills from Chattanooga south to Atlanta was the Western & Atlantic Railroad of the State of Georgia (W&ARR); also known simply as the “State Road.” This 138-mile (222km) s
tate-owned rail line was established on December 21, 1836. Construction began on July 4, 1837 to be completed in 1848, with the exception of the tunnel through the 1,040ft high Chetoogeta Mountain (tunnel grade 840ft). Passengers had to stagecoach around the mountain to board another train on the other side, while goods were transferred to freight wagons. In an undeniable engineering feat the 1,447ft tunnel, which became known as Tunnel Hill, was completed in October 1849, and the first train ran through on May 9, 1850. As with other Southern railroads it had a 5ft (1.524m) gauge – Northern railroads were 4ft 8½in (1.435m), today’s US standard gauge. While the W&A had only a single-track main line, rather than the preferred two, there were sidings to allow trains to bypass one another. Kingston, a key midway station and railyard, had four sidings while many other stations had only one or two; smaller stations often had none.

  Two spurs branched off the W&A. The shortest was the Etowah Railroad, built to serve the Cooper Iron Works, running 2½ miles eastward along the north side of the Etowah River. Its single hauling engine, the Yonah, would play an important role in the coming chase. The other spur was the Rome Railroad running from Kingston 14 miles west to Rome, Georgia. This short line was chartered by the Memphis Branch Railroad and Steamboat Company of Georgia in 1839 and was often unofficially called the “Rome and Kingston RR.” A branch line turning from the W&A at Dalton ran northeast, connecting to the East Tennessee & Virginia RR at Cleveland, Tennessee. However, this latter branch line played no role in the chase nor did the Rome RR.

  The Civil War was the first war in which railroads played a pivotal role. This was understood very early, particularly by the North, and with it came the realization that disrupting rail lines, at the right place and time, would be beneficial to any Union offensive. Most of these lines were fragile, being only single track and crossing numerous rivers and streams on easily ignitable wooden bridges. However, these lines were operated by dedicated professionals, were well maintained, had adequate maintenance facilities, and sufficient locomotives and rolling stock, at least at the beginning of the war. At that time, the W&A had 46 locomotives, far fewer than the North; the South had less than half the track miles found in the North – 9,800 miles as opposed to 20,800 miles – but for the most part she was fighting a strategic defense, with occasional forays into the North, and relied on internal lines of communications. The North, though, had vastly more rolling stock: 451,000 rail cars compared with the South’s 19,000. By 1862 the heavily used lines were in poor condition and little replacement rail was available.

  In early 1862 Generals Ulysses S. Grant (Army of the Tennessee) and Don Carlos Buell (Army of the Ohio) thrust out of Illinois and Indiana across western and central Kentucky into eastern Tennessee. In central Tennessee Brig Gen Ormsby M. Mitchel split off from 1st Corps of the Army of the Ohio with his 3rd Division. Striking out of Nashville, Tennessee he occupied Murfreesboro.

  WESTERN & ATLANTIC STATIONS AND RELATED SITES

  Station/Site Mile

  Atlanta 0

  Vinings 8

  Marietta 20

  Big Shanty 28

  Moon’s Station 30

  Acworth 35

  Allatoona 40

  Etowah River 44

  Etowah1 45

  Cartersville 47

  Cass Station 52

  Kingston2 59

  Adairsville 69

  Calhoun 79

  Oostanaula River 83

  Resaca 84

  Tilton 90

  Dalton 99

  Tunnel Hill 107

  Ringgold 115

  Chase ends 116.3

  Graysville 121

  Tennessee state line 125

  Chickamauga 126

  Chattanooga 138

  1 Etowah RR to Cooper IronWorks.

  2 Rome RR spur.

  Mitchel was under pressure from Lincoln, as were all Union commanders in the West, to make a strategic impact and begin isolating segments of the Confederacy from one another. His focus would be on seizing Huntsville, Alabama and then Chattanooga, Tennessee. Capturing Huntsville rail center would cut Atlanta off from the east-to-west running connected lines: East Tennessee & Georgia, East Tennessee & Virginia, and Virginia & Tennessee. All supplies and materials coming out of Georgia would have to be routed east and northeast through the Carolinas to Petersburg, Virginia, and then railed back west on the previously named lines. Not only would seizing this linchpin city of 4,000, Alabama’s third largest, severely disrupt Confederate logistics, but would provide a base to support the drive to Atlanta, an even more important objective.

  Tennessee was a steadfastly loyal supporter of the Confederate cause, providing more troops to the war effort than any other state, with the exception of Virginia. However, thousands of Tennesseans also fought for the North and there were Northern sympathizers in the Chattanooga area and throughout eastern Tennessee.

  In October 1861 a Tennessean, William B. Carter, proposed to Gen George H. Thomas, then commanding an independent force in eastern Kentucky, that bridge-burning raids could be launched into eastern Tennessee. Working with a Capt David Fry, Carter organized a ring of civilian saboteurs and struck on the night of November 8–9. The results were staggering in both effect and reaction. The volunteers burned nine bridges in northeast Alabama, northwest Georgia, and southeast Tennessee which, although not a large number, disrupted rail traffic for weeks. The most valuable effect, however, was that the raids sent shock waves through the Confederacy. The Rebel leadership was stunned and civilians realized with horror that there were insurgents in their midst. A counter-rebellion was under way and there was widespread fear that it might escalate, with direct attacks on loyal Southerners in their own homes. It was decided that this rebellion must be instantly crushed and any “bridge-burners” severely punished. The result was sweeping arrests of known Northern sympathizers and suspected insurrectionists. BrigGen Danville Leadbetter was placed in command of troops responsible for guarding bridges and railroad facilities as well as rounding up bridge-burners. His efforts were heavy-handed and rapidly degenerated into a terror campaign. Many were arrested without sufficient legal grounds, and vigilante mobs lynched suspected insurgents found hiding in the hills, leaving them hanging beside bridges as examples.

  In the long run these raids achieved little. Plans for a Northern offensive to exploit the initial success of the raids fell apart after disagreements among local commanders. Nor were any efforts made to destroy more bridges or impede their rebuilding. Another result of the bridge-burnings was an outcry from eastern Tennessee Union loyalists begging for rescue from Southern tyranny and reprisals. Hundreds were jailed without trial, often simply to settle old scores.

  Gen Don Carlos Buell, Army of the Ohio, was charged by Lincoln to liberate eastern Tennessee. Buell dragged his feet and, irrespective of the President’s wishes, focused more on central Tennessee, eventually taking Nashville in February. In March Buell was directly ordered to advance on Chattanooga, a mission he assigned to the more aggressive Mitchel’s 10,000-man 3rd Division. The detached division marched through Murfreesboro and reached Shelbyville, positioning to attack Huntsville 200 miles to the south and just across the Alabama state line. Mitchel’s next intended objective would be Chattanooga, less than 200 miles to the northeast of Huntsville, advancing on the city’s railroad axis. Chattanooga would be a tough nut to crack, especially if the Confederates were able to adequately reinforce and supply the rail center. It was protected by bands of high wooded ridges and hills on most sides, and a bend in the Tennessee River wrapped around the northwest side. Deep defensive positions were abundant and the avenues of approach were dominated by high ground. The maneuver of regiments on the thickly wooded and broken terrain would be extremely difficult. Mitchel was acutely aware of the Confederate ability to reinforce and supply Chattanooga from Atlanta via the W&A. This 136-mile-long northwest Georgia rail line would become instrumental to both sides throughout 1864.

  A typical Southern covered bridge, the primary
target of Andrews’ raiders. Covered bridges prolonged the life of the bridge and prevented winter icing.

  INITIAL STRATEGY

  BrigGen Ormsby M. Mitchel had graduated fifteenth from West Point in 1829, a classmate of Robert E. Lee. Deemed foolish and egotistic by some, he was, regardless, considered a genius by many others, having already made a name for himself as a mathematics professor, astronomer, attorney, and engineer – a true man for all seasons. “Old Stars,” as he was known, had taken command of the Army of the Ohio’s 3rd Division in September 1861 and was determined to establish a reputation by resolutely marching into Alabama, taking Huntsville and then Chattanooga, Tennessee, but he suffered frustration under Buell, whom he described as the “slowest person.” Mitchel was very aware of the importance of the W&A line and the impact it could have on the coming Chattanooga campaign. The 3rd Division marched into Murfreesboro without resistance on March 21. Retreating rebels had burned three large railroad bridges, which took ten days to rebuild. To the rear the still-lagging Buell had yet to repair smaller bridges to allow supply trains forward. Mitchel requested that Buell grant him control of the railroad to facilitate his resupply and troop movements, but he never received this authority. The division sat waiting with little threat of Confederate attack until, finally, on March 27, Mitchel received vague orders from Buell to continue detached operations, but he still lacked control of the railroad. They marched on Shelbyville, Tennessee, 40 miles to the southeast, to be greeted as liberators. In southwestern Tennessee Confederate forces rallied under Gen Albert Sidney Johnson’s smaller Army of Mississippi and launched a surprise attack on both Grant’s and Buell’s armies at Shiloh. The Battle of Shiloh (also known as Pittsburg Landing), one of the most bitterly-fought battles of the war, took place on April 6–7 while the 3rd Division enjoyed a pleasant spring encampment on the Duck River 200 miles to the east. Even though Union losses were higher in this, the most costly battle to date (13,000 to Johnson’s 10,700), the North prevailed and Memphis was captured within weeks.